- Reported
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- Issued
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- Package
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hickory-net
(crates.io)
- Type
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Vulnerability
- Categories
-
- Keywords
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#dns
#dnssec
#nsec
#nsec3
- Aliases
-
- References
-
- Patched
-
Description
When DNSSEC validation collected the NSEC and NSEC3 records from a response's authority section to check a denial of existence, it kept a record if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. A response could therefore pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name, and the forged record was used in the nonexistence proof.
An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can use this to get a forged NXDOMAIN or NODATA answer accepted as secure.
This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.
The fix keeps an NSEC or NSEC3 record only when its own signature validated.
Advisory available under CC0-1.0
license.