- Reported
-
- Issued
-
- Package
-
hickory-net
(crates.io)
- Type
-
Vulnerability
- Categories
-
- Keywords
-
#dns
#dnssec
#nsec3
- Aliases
-
- References
-
- Patched
-
Description
RFC 5155 section 8.5 says a NODATA response proven with NSEC3 needs an NSEC3 record whose hashed owner name equals the hash of the query name, and whose type bitmap has neither the query type nor CNAME.
NSEC3 NODATA validation skipped this when the query name was the zone apex (the SOA owner). If no NSEC3 record matched the query name, no closest encloser was found and no wildcard applied, it still returned a secure result.
An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can replay any genuine signed NSEC3 record from the zone together with the zone's signed SOA record, and get a NODATA answer for any record type at the apex accepted as secure. A recursor caches that denial for the negative TTL.
This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.
The fix treats such a response as bogus.
Advisory available under CC0-1.0
license.