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RUSTSEC-2026-0550

Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)

Reported
Issued
Package
hickory-proto (crates.io)
Type
Vulnerability
Categories
Keywords
#dns #dnssec #nsec #nsec3
Aliases
References
Patched
no patched versions
Unaffected
  • >=0.26.0-beta.1

Description

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

Advisory available under CC0-1.0 license.