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RUSTSEC-2026-0512

DNSSEC validation accepted an unrelated signed RRset as the answer (hickory-proto)

Reported
Issued
Package
hickory-proto (crates.io)
Type
Vulnerability
Categories
Keywords
#dns #dnssec
Aliases
References
CVSS Score
5.3 MEDIUM
CVSS Details
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality Impact
None
Integrity Impact
Low
Availability Impact
None
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Patched
no patched versions
Unaffected
  • >=0.26.0-beta.1

Description

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation treated a response with a non-empty answer section as a positive answer if its records validated, without checking that any of them matched the queried name and type. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could return a genuine signed RRset for another name or type and have it accepted as a validated answer.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

Advisory available under CC0-1.0 license.