- Reported
-
- Issued
-
- Package
-
rustls
(crates.io)
- Type
-
Vulnerability
- Categories
-
- Aliases
-
- References
-
- CVSS Score
- 2.3
LOW
- CVSS Details
-
- Attack Vector
- Local
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- High
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality Impact
- Low
- Integrity Impact
- None
- Availability Impact
- None
- CVSS Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Patched
-
- Unaffected
-
Description
When a server rejects Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), the client completes the
handshake using the outer ClientHello and authenticates the server against the
ECH config's public_name. At the end of that handshake, rustls encrypted and
queued any application data buffered via ClientConnection::writer() before
queueing the ech_required alert.
The application correctly receives
Error::PeerIncompatible(ServerRejectedEncryptedClientHello), but the next
write_tls() call (needed to send the alert) also sends the buffered
application data. Plaintext meant for the inner server therefore goes to the
client-facing server named by public_name.
That server is authenticated, so this is not exploitable by an unauthenticated
party, but it violates RFC 9849 section 6.1.6, which requires the client to
abort with ech_required "before sending any application data to the server".
This affects only clients that:
- use
EchMode::Enable (GREASE ECH is not affected),
- write application data before the handshake completes, and
- connect to a server that rejects their ECH config (for example, because it is stale).
The underlying ordering bug is older, but before 0.23.44 the client checked
the server certificate against the inner server name rather than public_name,
so certificate verification failed first and no data was sent.
Advisory available under CC0-1.0
license.