- Reported
-
- Issued
-
- Package
-
ruzstd
(crates.io)
- Type
-
Vulnerability
- Categories
-
- Keywords
-
#zstd
#decompression-bomb
#oom
- References
-
- CVSS Score
- 7.5
HIGH
- CVSS Details
-
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality Impact
- None
- Integrity Impact
- None
- Availability Impact
- High
- CVSS Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Patched
-
Description
A crafted .zst input under 128 KB can force ruzstd to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with an out-of-memory condition. Since ruzstd is a decoder for untrusted input, a single small file is enough to take down anything decoding it.
The compressed size of a block was capped at 128 KB, but a compressed block's decompressed size was never checked against Block_Maximum_Size = min(Window_Size, 128 KiB) (RFC 8878). In execute_sequences the output was built with no running bound and no flush between blocks, so one block could expand to gigabytes — bypassing both the configured window-size limit and the block-by-block streaming that would otherwise release memory. (A related u32 counter overflow on such a block caused an additional panic.)
This is a denial of service only; memory access stays in bounds (no corruption, no RCE).
ruzstd is also built as a dependency of the Rust standard library via rustc-dep-of-std; in the toolchain it is used only to load zstd-compressed debug symbols, so the toolchain-side impact is limited.
Fixed in 0.9.1 (commit d3907c9), which enforces the per-block output bound. Upgrade to ruzstd >= 0.9.1.
Advisory available under CC0-1.0
license.