- Reported
-
- Issued
-
- Package
-
quinn-proto
(crates.io)
- Type
-
Vulnerability
- Categories
-
- Keywords
-
#panic
- Aliases
-
- References
-
- CVSS Score
- 7.5
HIGH
- CVSS Details
-
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality Impact
- None
- Integrity Impact
- None
- Availability Impact
- High
- CVSS Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Patched
-
- Unaffected
-
Description
When sending ACK_FREQUENCY frames is enabled through
TransportConfig::ack_frequency_config(Some(..)), the peer's transport parameters could cause
AckFrequencyState::candidate_max_ack_delay to call Duration::clamp with a minimum greater
than its maximum, which panics.
For example, a peer advertising a min_ack_delay of 100,000 microseconds and a max_ack_delay
of 100 milliseconds passes transport parameter validation. At a 5 ms RTT, the lower bound of the
clamp becomes 100 ms while the upper bound is 25 ms, violating the precondition of clamp and
panicking while driving the connection. Both automatically derived and explicitly configured
maximum ACK delays use this calculation.
Sending ACK_FREQUENCY frames is disabled by default, so only endpoints that opt in are affected.
The flaw was corrected in 0.11.18 by computing the delay with explicit minimum and maximum bounds
instead of clamp.
Thanks to @zerox80 for reporting this issue.
Advisory available under CC0-1.0
license.