- Reported
-
- Issued
-
- Package
-
nostr
(crates.io)
- Type
-
Vulnerability
- Categories
-
- Keywords
-
#panic
#nip04
#nip47
#nwc
- References
-
- CVSS Score
- 7.5
HIGH
- CVSS Details
-
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality Impact
- None
- Integrity Impact
- None
- Availability Impact
- High
- CVSS Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Patched
-
>=0.44.6, <0.45.0-alpha.1>=0.45.0-alpha.6
- Affected Functions
- Version
nostr::nips::nip04::decrypt-
nostr::nips::nip04::decrypt_to_bytes-
Description
The nostr crate did not validate the length of the initialization vector
decoded from the ?iv= portion of a NIP-04 encrypted message.
The decoded IV was converted from a byte slice to the 16-byte AES-CBC IV type
using a conversion that asserts the slice length. As a result, an IV whose
decoded length was not exactly 16 bytes caused a panic before ciphertext
decryption. For example, ?iv=AAAA decodes to a three-byte IV and triggers the
panic.
Applications that decrypt untrusted NIP-04 content are affected. The issue is
also reachable through NIP-47 (Nostr Wallet Connect), where response and
notification events from a malicious or compromised wallet service are passed
to NIP-04 decryption. If the panic is not isolated, a crafted event can terminate
the application or disrupt message processing, causing a denial of service.
The issue does not affect confidentiality or integrity.
The flaw was corrected by converting the decoded IV to [u8; 16] using a
checked conversion. Invalid IV lengths now return a Malformed error instead of
panicking.
Credit
Discovered and responsibly disclosed by Muhammed Shekho (mhd-shekho.com).
Advisory available under CC0-1.0
license.