- Reported
-
- Issued
-
- Package
-
boxlite
(crates.io)
- Type
-
Vulnerability
- Categories
-
- Keywords
-
#sandbox
#container
#oci
#tar
#symlink
#path-traversal
- Aliases
-
- References
-
- CVSS Score
- 10
CRITICAL
- CVSS Details
-
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality Impact
- High
- Integrity Impact
- High
- Availability Impact
- High
- CVSS Vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Patched
-
Description
Affected versions of boxlite extract OCI image layer tarballs without
fully containing path resolution to the extraction root. A crafted layer
containing a symlink whose target is an absolute on-host path (e.g.
escape -> /tmp) followed by a file entry that resolves through that
symlink (e.g. escape/<path>/pwned.txt) caused the extractor to write
the payload to the host filesystem outside the intended rootfs directory.
The fix in v0.9.0 routes every destructive filesystem operation through a
SafeRoot handle (openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on Linux, lexical fallback
elsewhere) so that no tar entry can resolve outside the extraction root,
even with adversarial symlinks placed by earlier entries in the same
layer.
This is a container-escape during image extraction, exploitable by any
user who pulls or loads a malicious OCI image — including via
SimpleBox(rootfs_path=...) from an untrusted local layout.
Advisory available under CC0-1.0
license.